The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil

The Lucifer Effect How Good People crop EvilIn Lucifer Effect Dr Zimbardo discusses his Stanford prison house house Experiment conducted in 1971 in relevance to the prison abuses in Abu Ghraib in 2003. It is a dread harbor presenting the shift from an average good person into a rubber brutal various(prenominal) the metamorphosis from Lucifer into Satan. At the same beat Dr Zimbardo explains how this transformation is possible, how group dynamics and situational f actuateors, maintained by the system enamour human behaviour to create monsters take downward(a) of normal good spate. Moreover, Zimbardo discusses how to fight ourselves from becoming an evil. At the end he presents the victory of heroism and deliver a bank everyone is also cap sufficient to do the most high-flown acts.BodyWhat asks good people do mischievousness things? This is a strike forefront which occupies our mind remembering the mass murders such as those of Cambodia, Darfur, Rwanda, final solutio n or May Lai. Would Holocaust occur again, Askenasy asks in his book be we all Nazis? (in Blass, 1992). Milgram answers that if a system of death camps were set up in the United States of the sort we had seen in Nazi Germany, one would be able to find suitable personnel for those camps in any medium-sized Ameri washbasin townspeople (CBS News, 1979, p. 7-8 cited in Blass, 1999, p. 956). Although most people would deny it claiming they could never be akin them. (Blass, 2004, p. 35-36 Meyer, p. 71) surprisingly the examples from history and research studies have shown that everyone is capable of playing even in the most horrifying ways depending on the situational circumstances. People practically underestimate the impact of the external factors because they cannot admit how easily they could be manipulated by situational forces, the concept known as fundamental attribution error (Jones Harris, 1967 gigabit and Malone, 1995 Gilbert, 1998 Zimbardo, 1990). The studies on obedience (Baumrind, 1964 Burger, 2007 Burley McGuiness, 1977 Glasser, 1971 Halberstam, 1965 Kaufmann, 1967 Kilham Mann, 1974 Meeus Raaijmakers, 1987 Mantell, 1971 Milgram, 1963 1965 1974, p. 195 Ring, Wallston, Corey, 1970 Shanab Yahya, 1977, 1978 Sullivan, 1963 Taylor, 1970), institutional aggression (Johnson, 1986 1998), mass killings and genocides (Browing, 1993, Katz, 2004 Staub 1989 Waller, 2002) have indicated that fierceness is not determined by dispositional factors but it is a product of a situation. What mixer psychology has given to an judgment of human nature is the discovery that forces larger than ourselves determine our mental life and our actions chief among these forces is the power of the social situation (Banaji, 2001, p. 15).We dont have to look far to find an example of a blind authority follower. The Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann was an ordinary citizen who was charged with struggle crimes and crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Trial in 1961 while he was average doing his job (Arendt, 1963, p. 135), only following orders (Zimbardo 2007, p. 218). Hanna Arendt helps us to understand that the Holocaust was not executed by fanatics but by normal people who trustworthy the state rules and therefore perceived their actions as normal. (Waxman, 2009). Anyone can be seduced to act wrong (Zimbardo 2004, p. 25). The Eichmann was not an exception the manpower of Nazis in Final final result was supported even by average elderly German citizens (Browning, 1993, p.16). The question what makes people act in the destructive ways has been long answered blaming the speculative genes, the unfit seeds responsible for pathological behaviour (Haney, Banks, Zimbardo, 1973b Zimbardo, 2004, p. 21, 24). Starting from the landmark study, Stanford prison Experiment (SPE) (Haney et al.,1973 Zimbardo, 1989 Zimbardo, Maslach, Haney, 2000) Lucifer Effect challenges this notion and argues that people act in the inhumane ways because they get poisoned by extern al factors, by a moment of a situation (Lewin, 1951) which is often supported by the bad system giving permission for a pathological behavior (Zimbardo, 2007).Stanford Prison Study shows the power of institution to influence the individual. It describes the transformation of normal, average students into aggressive, sadistic guards or passive, helpless and emotionally devastated prisoners playing the roles in the mock prison created in the dungeon of Stanford University. The study predicted for two weeks had to be terminated bonny only in 6 days because of the emotional breakdown of 5 of the students (Zimbardo, 1971 Zimbardo et al., 2000 2004, p. 40).Dr Zimbardo saw the SPE as the parallel to the controversial abuses in Abu Ghraib (AG), which shaken the moral philosophy of the world in 2004 (p. 324 A Human Rights Watch bill HRW, 2004 2005 Stannard, 2004 Kersten Sidky, 2005 Dorf 2010 Zimbardo). The fabulous humiliations of Iraki detainees by American soldiers, who abused them in a compute of horrifying ways (p. 357 Schlesinger et al., 2004 Taguba, 2004 Fay, 2004, p. 4) was not a surprise for Dr Zimbardo who saw it in SPE where prisoners became numbers inducing their powerless and dependence, were dehumanized and involved in offend tasks (p. 219 Haney et al, 1973b Zimbardo et al., 2009). President Bush described the AG events as the incidents of few bad apples (Landford, 2009 Associated Press, 2005 Childs, 2005 Fox News, 2004 HRW, 2004 2005) who were punished in the names of merelyice (HRW, 2005). Zimbardo, an expert avow for one of the guards, argues that there were not rotten apples, which should have been found nefarious but it was the fault of the bad barrel which corrupted everything inside it (Zimbardo, 2008). deal in SPE good people were put in a bad, psychologically unhealthy situation, which had a dramatic impact on their behaviour and produced aberrant deeds. (Zimbardo et al., 2000, p. 17). The soldiers in Abu Ghraib were just US Military Police Army Reservists (p. 335 Schlesinger et al., p. 12 Taguba, 2004) without any preparation to run the prison (p. 346, 377 Hersh, 2004 Schlesinger et al., 2004, p. 16 Taguba, 2004), on the button bid the students role- playing the guards in the prison- worry stimulated environment or just like the elderly men who joined the crimes of the Nazis. When placed in a fiction unfamiliar situation, their learnt reaction patterns stopped working and their morale disengaged (Zimbardo, 2008) leading to the illegal behaviour.Soldiers, in the middle of the interrogation center, experienced a lot of wring from Central Intelligence Agency to break the enemy (p. 336-37, 349, 382 Schlesinger et al., 2004, p.8 CBS News , ). Labelling the Iraqi the enemy (Allen Priest, 2004 CNN, 2001 Landford, 2009), enouncing the war with terrorism (p. 377, 430 HRW, 2004 2005 Miles, 2006),) and the recent change in field attitude toward torture after 9/11 maintained by worldwide media and American administ ration (Zimbardo, 2004, p.35) gave the guards the permission to dehumanize the prisoners (Strozier as cited in Schwartz, 2004) and treating them like dogs (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 337, 414).The powerful systemic forces created a fear across the rural bea Zimbardo 2004, p. 35) and induced systematic propaganda under the cover of national security exactly as described in the novel 1984 (George Orwell, 1981) or Fahrenheit 451 (Ray Bradbury, 2007), in which societys enslavement to conformity was generated. It was enough to justify the horrific behaviour and do even killing acceptable and rationalized (p. 430 Zimbardo, 2004, p. 28, 35 Stratman, 2004).Additionally, there was no humble in the Abu Ghraib and the unit was understaffed (p.336 Danner, 2004, p. 17 Gray Zielinski, 2006 Schlesinger, 2004 Stannard, 2004 Taguba, 2004). The place was unbroken in a secret (HRW, 2005), constantly under attack (Fay, 2004 Schlesinger 2004, p.11) without sufficient control (p. 348 Fay 2004, Schlesing er, 2004, p. 13 HRW, 2004 2005) and strong leadership (Fay, 2004. Schlesinger, 2004, p.16). The situation was far from normal. Additionally, no formal policies or procedures to follow (p. 347) and confusion regarding the Geneva Convention (HRW, 2004 2005 Schlesinger, p. 6-7, 14, 29, 37-38) gave the guards permission to do unthinkable crimes and torture like the superintendent Zimbardo let the abuses lead in SPE. As Lt. Col. Thomas Kolditz argued when the power is given to people without backsliding it is a pure formula for violence (Donn, 2004). Human Rights Watch Report agrees with Dr Zimbardo that not few individuals should have been blamed for brutality on place but the extraordinary pressures of the system which contributed to the abuses (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 47 HRW, 2004 2005), the architects of the policies were responsible for creating the situation where abuses became a part of normality (HRW, 2004 2005).The normality of the soldiers was the crime for us watching it from distance. If the guards had understood the mechanism of powerful situational forces maybe they could have been able to resist acting scrofulously. One of the factors contributing to the immoral deeds is deindividuation (Deiner, 1980 Festinger, Pepitone, Newcomb, 1952 Zimbardo 1970)) which fosters anonymity and violence, shutting down rational thinking about the consequences (p. 219 Festinger et al., 1952 Zimbardo, 1969 1970 2004, p. 33). What is the most frightening is the fact that deindividuation can be achieved simply by changing external appearance (Golding, 1954, p. 58, 63 John Watson Zimbardo, 2007, ch. 3, 10.Another factor is moral disengagement from negative actions by justifying the conduct, diffusing responsibility for own actions (Kelman Hamilton, 1989 Milgram, 1963, 1965, 1974, 1992), blaming the account cogency on the role play (p. 218 Freedman, 1969 Haney, Zimbardo, 1973c), while blindly following authority (Bandura, Underwood, Fromson, 1975 Darley Latane, 1968) , conforming to the group norms pursuit acceptance (Moore, 1978, p. 36), discriminating those from different groups (Baumeister, 1997 Bernard, Ottenberg Redl, 1968 Johnson, 1986, 1998 Staub, 1989 Tajfel, Flament, Billig, Bundy, 1971 Waller, 2002), ignoring the consequences of the action and blaming the victims for the outcome while dehumanizing them (Bandura, 1975 1988 1996 1999 Bandura, Fromson, Underwood, 1975 Bandura et al. 1996 Bandura, Osofsky, Zimbardo, 1999 2005 1998, 2003, str 511 Darley Latane, 1968 ). An individual has to be perceived as inhuman in order to make an unethical conduct comfortable for the perpetrator (p. 402 Kelman, 1973 Leyens et al., 2003),. Dehumanization process includes position people into the roles (Haney Zimbardo, 1973) e.g. giving them the same uniforms and assigning numbers. As discrepancy amidst the immoral actions and personal beliefs occurs cognitive dissonance is created (p. 219 Aronson , Carlsmith, 1968 Festinger, 1957). The bigger the discrepancy mingled with ones values and actions the more motivated the individual is to attain harmony (Janis and baron, 1954 King and Janis,1956 Culbertson, 1957 Zimbardo, 1965).What is more, when people cannot deny their actions they tend to rationalize them persuading themselves and others that they followed the rational guidelines when making the conclusiveness (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 220).Grossman argues further that with the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and allow kill (Grossman , 1995, p.4). It supports the notion that systematisation in creating the enemy which threaten the base hit of people play an important role in inducing antisocial behaviour (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 43-45). When a pathological behaviour is additionally supported by administration such as state or an institution it opens the doors for wicked abuses. As it is the responsibility of government is to establish and maintain ethical guidelines across a st ate, country or world Lucifer Effect offers an advice for the authorities to prevent situations which set up conditions for individuals to behave immorally.Zimbardo emphasises that understanding the socio-psychological process of situational transformation is not an excuse for individual to commit crimes. It is just an explanation how people can be corrupted to do inhumane deeds and thus it should be wisely used to resist the evil. (Wang and Zimbardo, 2006-2008). Dr Zimbardo also gives a hope that as much as people atomic number 18 capable of error the creative mastermind of human beings can also generate marvellous actions (p. 444, Zimbardo, 1996, p. 621, str. 504, Zimbardo, 2008). Eventually, Lucifer Effect teaches how to be a hero in wait (see p. 330-331, 457-458, 471, 474-475, Lankford, 2009 Zimbardo et al., 1999 Zimbardo, 2004, p. 40, Zimbardo, 2008ConclusionThe Lucifer Effect presents how good people turn evil. It involves understanding what powerful dynamic factors come into play during the human character metamorphosis within different circumstances. Lucifer Effect explains that personality variables contribute just a bit to produce certain behaviour, alleviating or escalating the impact of the situational forces, which are lying at the base of the psycho-sociological interactions (Banaji, 2001, p. 15 Mischel, 1968 Mischel, Shoda, Rodriguez, 1989 Mischel, Shoda, Wright, 1993 Mischel Shoda, 1995 Mischel, 2004 Staub, 1898, p. 126, 127). The argument in the book is indeed a convincing demonstration that evil deeds are attributable to the power of the bad situation (Zimbardo, 1989 Asch, 1952 Sherif, 1966 Tajfel, 1978) which is often maintained by the bad system (Zimbardo, 2008). Nevertheless, Dr Zimbardo also emphasises that understanding evil is not excusing it and everyone should be responsible for their own actions because the individual can learn how to resist immoral actions (Zimbardo, 2008). The account Dr Zimbardo takes agrees with Hanna Aren dts (1977) statement that unless people are insane they have ability to tell right from wrong then we must be able to demand its exercise from every sane person, no matter how conditioned or ignorant, intelligent or stupid, he may happen to be ( p. 13).